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Only "dangerous" individuals may be indefinitely detained. Is a
one percent chance of a future crime clear and convincing evidence
of dangerousness? For sex offenders, fear and uncertainty in case
law leave open this passage to limbo. This Article closes it.
The due process balancing test used to evaluate standards of
proof provides the framework. This Article explains the relationship
between the standard of proof and the definition of "dangerous" and
argues that only an approach combining the two is consistent with
the Constitution.
Applying decision theory with assumptions favoring the
government, this Article calculates a minimum likelihood of
recidivism for commitment. Of the twenty jurisdictions with sex
offender commitment, just one requires something close to that
constitutional floor. Thousands have been detained applying
unconstitutional standards, and the vast majority remains so.
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No passion so effectually robs the mind of all its powers of
acting and reasoning as fear.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Charles Edward Allman was indefinitely detained
as a dangerous sex offender.' His risk of recidivism within five
years was estimated by an actuarial instrument as 21%, a figure
that one expert adjusted downward to between 2.2% and 5.3% to
reflect the overall sex offender recidivism rate in the jurisdiction."
The prosecutor argued to the jury:
You are the judges. You are the gatekeepers. You decide
what's acceptable, what is an acceptable risk to this
community. And that's what you decide. Is it 90 percent?
The law tells you it doesn't have to be over 50 percent. Is it
five percent? Is it 10 percent? Is it one percent? You decide
what makes it likely.
Contrary to the prosecutor's argument, there is a minimum
likelihood of recidivism. That minimum derives from the Due
Process Clause.' This Article argues that the detention for five
years of a dangerous sex offender is unconstitutional unless the
1. EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUn IDEAS OF
THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL 96 (George Bell & Sons 1889) (1757).
2. People v. Allman, No. D055968, 2010 WL 4461758, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 9,
2010).
3. Id. at *1, *3.
4. Id. at *6.
5. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall .. . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . ... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . .");
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("This Court has repeatedly recognized that
civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that
requires due process protection."); infra Part II.B (arguing that a minimum probability of
recidivism is required by the Due Process Clause).
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predicted probability of recidivism within five years is 75% or
higher. Without such a constitutional floor, the requirement of
dangerousness would be, as the prosecutor suggested,
meaningless.
Sexual violence is a serious social problem: each year, an
estimated 300,000 women are raped and 81,000 children are
sexually abused.' Sexual violence is not a new problem, nor is the
detention and treatment of sex offenders a new idea. In the
1930s, states began adopting the first generation of sex offender
commitment statutes, commonly referred to as "sexual
psychopath" laws.' Well over half of the states had adopted such
laws by the late 1960s, but by 1990, they remained on the books
in only a handful of states. Policymakers had concluded that
"sexual psychopaths" could be neither identified nor effectively
treated.9
Things changed in 1990. That was the year Washington
State adopted the first of the current generation of sex offender
commitment laws, often referred to as "sexually violent predator"
(or "SVP") laws.o The main innovation was detention after sex
offenders had served their criminal sentences." Nineteen other
states and the federal government have followed suit, and
thousands of individuals are now committed." This change of
direction was not driven by new statistics-overall, sex offenders
appear less likely than other criminals to reoffend" and the
6. See Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual
Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 412 (2010).
7. John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate
Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655, 659-
60 (1992).
8. Id. at 660-61.
9. Id. at 662 (quoting SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL, JOHN PARRY, & BARBARA A. WEINER,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 743 (3d ed. 1985)).
10. See HOWARD ZONANA ET AL., DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE
REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSOCIATION 24 (1999) (stating that "Washington
was the first state to enact a law for the commitment of sexually violent predators");
Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration at
What Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, 214-15 (2011).
11. Rice Lave, supra note 10, at 214.
12. See id. at 215 (19 other states); KATHY GOOKIN, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY, COMPARISON OF STATE LAWS AUTHORIZING INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF
SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: 2006 UPDATE, REVISED 1 (2007), available at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/07-08-1101.pdf (reporting 4,534 persons held under SVP
laws).
13. See PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. Sclirr & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED
FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1-2 (2003) (explaining that the sex offender rearrest rate for any
type of crime was 43%, whereas the overall rearrest rate for all released prisoners was
68% and 5.3% of released sex offenders were rearrested within three years for a sex
crime); PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
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evidence of treatment effectiveness is equivocal'"-rather, the
motivation was a string of heart-wrenching cases and resulting
outrage and fear."
Fear created the policy, but can fear sustain it against
constitutional challenge? Whether fear, apart from actual risk, is
a sufficient basis to deprive an individual of liberty turns out to
be a critical question in setting the minimum recidivism
threshold to justify indefinite detention. Understanding why
requires explanation.
In Addington v. Texas, the Court held that to justify
traditional civil commitment of a mentally ill person, the state
must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence."
That is a heightened standard of proof, somewhere between
preponderance ("more likely than not") and beyond a reasonable
doubt." Essentially every lower court since Addington has
concluded that clear and convincing evidence is required for sex
offender commitment as well." However, Part II.A shows that
the standard of proof in this context is still an open question.
Neither Addington nor any subsequent U.S. Supreme Court
opinion has set a minimum level of dangerousness.'9
Commentators agree that dangerousness consists of four
components of future harm: (a) magnitude, (b) probability,
STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 9 tbl.10 (2002) (showing
13.4% of released robbers were rearrested for robbery within three years, 22.0% of
assaulters for assault, 23.4% of burglars for burglary, 33.9% of larcenists for larceny,
11.5% of motor vehicle thieves for motor vehicle theft, 19.0% of defrauders for fraud,
41.2% of drug offenders for drug offenses); see also La Fond, supra note 7, at 667 ("[N]o
clear evidence suggests that sex offenders as a group are more likely to reoffend than
other criminals.").
14. See infra note 58.
15. La Fond, supra note 7, at 671-74; see also ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT:
AMERICA'S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 7-8 (2006)
(similar for Minnesota); David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word,
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992) (retelling the horrible story of Earl Shriner's
sexual mutilation of a seven-year-old boy two years after Shriner's release from prison,
and the reaction, including passage of Washington's SVP law); Mari M. "Miki" Presley,
Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and
Care Act: Replacing Criminal Justice with Civil Commitment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487,
488 (1999) (similar for Florida).
16. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
17. Id. at 431-33.
18. See Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 253, 276 (2011) (stating that the "overwhelming majority" of states rely on
Addington and require clear and convincing proof for civil commitments).
19. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33 (requiring clear and convincing evidence to
prove dangerousness and civilly commit a mentally ill person, but leaving undefined the
minimum likelihood of recidivism required to prove dangerousness); infra Part II.B
(examining the issue of likelihood of recidivism).
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(c) frequency, and (d) imminence.2 0 The goal of this Article is to
explore the constitutional floor on the second component:
probability of recidivism. (I make and defend assumptions
regarding the other three components in the text.21 )
To recognize an implied minimum likelihood of recidivism, a
deeper understanding of the relationship between standards of
proof and recidivism thresholds is needed.22 The bottom line is
that only by factoring in both standards (and prediction error)
can one evaluate the strength of the government's justification
for commitment. And that is what Addington's balancing test
requires: weighing the private and public interests at stake.23
Return to fear. If fear gets independent weight in the
balancing test, then there may be no effective floor on
dangerousness. Passion trumps reason and liberty. But the
Addington test defines the relevant parameters, which should
exclude fear and which in turn can be quantified and
weighed." Applying decision theory, I estimate a minimum
recidivism threshold of 75%. To be more precise, a sex offender
can be committed for five years only if his likelihood of
perpetrating a sexually violent crime within five years is 75%
or higher. At each step in the analysis, I make assumptions
favorable to the government in order to achieve a solid
constitutional floor.
Do current sex offender commitment regimes require a
likelihood of recidivism at or above the 75% threshold? With
one exception (Illinois), the answer is no or probably no." This
means nineteen states and the federal government have
detained thousands using unconstitutional standards. Illinois,
which requires the probability of recidivism to be "much more
likely than not," can serve as a model for other jurisdictions."
In short, locking someone up to prevent a violent sex offense
is unconstitutional absent strong evidence that he or she would
otherwise commit such an offense. And fear should not count as
20. Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of
Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L.
33, 37 (1997) (citing Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and
Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 298 (1992) and
ALEXANDER D. BRoOs, LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 576 (1974)).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 202, 205, 216.
22. See infra Part II.
23. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
24. See id. at 425, 430 (weighing the state and individual's interest in light of the
incompatibility of psychological diagnoses and the beyond reasonable doubt standard);
infra Part III.
25. See infra Part V.
26. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 207/35(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2000).
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evidence. The stakes could hardly be higher: the liberty and
safety of thousands hang in the balance.
II. Two OPEN QUESTIONS
The government must prove that a sex offender is
dangerous in order to commit him.2 7 One component of
dangerousness is probability of recidivism. Like all fact
questions, dangerousness must be proven to a particular
degree of confidence, or standard of proof.2" The standard of
proof and threshold probability of recidivism, taken together,
determine the effective risk level required to commit an
individual. To illustrate: many sex offenders will qualify for
commitment if the government is required to prove a 10%
chance of recidivism by clear and convincing evidence; fewer if
the standard of proof is raised to beyond a reasonable doubt;
and many fewer still if the risk threshold is raised from 10% to
50%. The constitutional minimum standard of proof and
recidivism threshold are unsettled.
A. The Required Standard of Proof
The conventional wisdom in lower courts is that the Due
Process Clause requires that dangerousness for sex offender
commitment must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence." This view derives from Addington v. Texas, and has
surface appeal."0 However, the requisite standard of proof
remains an open question under U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, and underappreciated older case law strongly
suggests a higher standard.
27. See Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science:
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 703-04
(2011). Over 90% of sex offenders are male. See Keith Soothill, Sex Offender Recidivism,
in 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 145, 162 (Michael Tonry ed., 2010).
28. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-27.
29. E.g., United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2010); Aruanno v.
Hayman, 384 F. App'x 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Coho, No. 09-CV-754 WJ,
2009 WL 3156739, at *6 (D.N.M. Sept. 18, 2009); Jones v. Blake, No. 4:06 CV 402 ERW
DDN, 2008 WL 4820788, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2008); United States v. Abregana, 574 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1138 (D. Haw. 2008); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 331
(D. Mass. 2007); Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 109-10 (Fla. 2002); In re Detention
of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ill. 2000); People v. Williams, 580 N.W.2d 438, 442
(Mich. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 589 N.W.2d 287 (Mich. 1998); State v. Ward, 369 N.W.2d
293, 295-96 (Minn. 1985); In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Mo. 2008) (en banc);
In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d
570, 578 (Va. 2005); John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil
Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1325-26 (1996). But see In
re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d at 592-94 (Teitelman, J., dissenting).
30. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.
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The Court has not addressed the standard of proof
question directly in the sex offender commitment context. The
statute involved in two of its recent SVP decisions-Kansas v.
Hendricks" and Kansas v. Crane32-required proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. And neither of these cases, nor the even
more recent United States v. Comstock decision, included any
analysis of the standard of proof." Jurisdictions split equally
between requiring clear and convincing evidence" and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."
That explains why Addington is so important. Addington
involved traditional civil commitment, the basic requirements
of which are mental illness and a danger to self or others." The
Court squarely held that due process requires proof of
dangerousness (and mental illness) by at least clear and
convincing evidence." The Court expressly rejected the lower
preponderance standard and the higher standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Obviously, Addington controls unless the distinction
between mental illness civil commitment and sex offender civil
commitment matters. Analysis of Addington's reasoning is
required to answer that question. Addington began by
recognizing that the standard of proof functions to
communicate the degree of confidence required for a result and
31. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997).
32. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 416 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a),(b) (2000)).
33. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954-56 (2010). For a critique
of Comstock and reliance on Addington in this context, see Ryan K. Melcher, Note, There
Ain't No End for the "Wicked": Implications of and Recommendations for § 4248 of The
Adam Walsh Act After United States v. Comstock, 97 IowA L. REV. 629, 652-56 (2012).
For other procedural due process arguments against the federal sex offender commitment
law, see Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has The Adam Walsh Act Lowered
the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
391, 417-22 (2011).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2011); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(1)(A) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.495(1) (Supp. 2012); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 71-1209(1) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:11(I) (LexisNexis 2012);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.32(a) (West 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.07(d)
(McKinney 2011); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 25-03.3-13 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-908(C)
(2011).
35. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(A) (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604
(West 2010); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 207/35(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2000); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 229A.7(5) (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 123A, § 14(d) (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100(A) (2002); TEx. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.062(a) (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1)
(West 2008); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(3)(a) (West 2007).
36. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 420 (1979).
37. Id. at 433.
38. Id. at 425-31.
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to allocate the risk of error between the parties." The Court
also noted that the standard of proof has at least symbolic
value, "reflect [ing] the value society places on individual
liberty."" Citing, inter alia, Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court
explained that the choice of standard involves balancing "the
extent of the individual's interest in not being involuntarily
confined indefinitely and the state's interest in committing the
emotionally disturbed.""
The preponderance standard was held to be not high
enough given the individual's weighty interest in avoiding
stigmatizing civil commitment.4 2 But beyond a reasonable
doubt was too heavy a burden for the state to shoulder.' The
Court explained: "[Elven though an erroneous confinement
should be avoided in the first instance, the layers of
professional review and observation of the patient's condition,
and the concern of family and friends generally will provide
continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be
corrected.""
The Court also relied on a practical concern: "Given the
lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis,
there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous."" On its own, this
statement is puzzling." If the Constitution requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence cannot meet that
standard, then this is an argument against civil commitment,
39. Id. at 423 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
40. Id. at 425 (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)).
41. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
42. Id. at 425-27.
43. See id. at 429.
44. Id. at 428-29. "One who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in
need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma." Id.; ef Fredrick E. Vars,
Illusory Consent: When an Incapacitated Patient Agrees to Treatment, 87 OR. L. REV. 353,
355 (2008) ("Assent without capacity is not an expression of autonomy; it is at best an
illusion of autonomy.").
45. Addington, 441 U.S. at 429; accord Andrew von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal
Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BuFF. L. REV. 717, 743
(1972). But see Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270,
274 (1940) ("These underlying conditions [including likelihood of doing harm], calling for
evidence of past conduct pointing to probable consequences are as susceptible of proof as
many of the criteria constantly applied in prosecutions for crime.").
46. One commentator has argued that this statement is exactly backwards. See
William H. Abrashkin, Comment, The Standard of Proof in Civil Commitment
Proceedings in Massachusetts: Superintendent of Worcester State Hospital v. Hagberg, 1
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 71, 92 (1978).
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not a reason to lower the proof standard."' However, later in
the opinion, the Court more appropriately tied the point back
to its balancing test: "Nor should the state be required to
employ a standard of proof that may completely undercut its
efforts to further the legitimate interests of both the state and
the patient that are served by civil commitments."'
Does Addington's essential reasoning apply with equal
force to sex offender civil commitment? No. There are several
important differences between mental illness and sex offender
civil commitment. The impact of each on the balancing test
will be assessed.
First, as bad as the stigma associated with mental illness
surely is,4 it is hard to imagine anything more stigmatizing
than being labeled a "sexually violent predator."o On the other
hand, many jurisdictions require a sex offense charge as a
prerequisite for commitment, so much of the stigmatization
may already be done." Still, on balance, this factor weighs
slightly in favor of a higher standard of proof for sex offender
civil commitment.
Second, review of sex offender detention is often annual,
not "continuous," as the Court found in Addington." Reliance
on family and friends to police the process-questionable in
the mental health context"-is arguably even less effective for
47. See People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 368 (Cal. 1975) (en bane) ("The
law ... does not weaken the standard of proof merely because the evidence is weak."); cf
Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1305 (1973) ("[Tlhere is nothing about the nature of
predictive judgments that supports the view that they require fewer safeguards than
determinations of specific past acts.").
48. Addington, 441 U.S. at 430.
49. Jeffrey M. Barrett, Comment, A State of Disorder: An Analysis ofMental-Health
Parity in Wisconsin and a Suggestion for Future Legislation, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 1159,
1162.
50. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997); La Fond, supra note 7, at
697; cf Burnick, 535 P.2d at 362 ("When to [the] stigma [of mental illness] is added a
charge of unlawful sexual behavior, the shame is complete.").
51. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (2005); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 841.003(b) (West 2010).
52. See Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional
Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 191-92 (1997) (noting that
stigma from sex offender commitment "arguably much worse" than criminal conviction
and often "cumulative").
53. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08(a) (2005); In re Van Orden, 271 S.W.3d 579,
586 (Mo. 2008) (en bane); see also Addington, 441 U.S. at 428-29.
54. See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 77 (1982) ("[Wlhere
families and friends exist, they are usually only too glad to have the bothersome person
removed from circulation.").
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sex offenders." Professor Eric Janus has demonstrated that
error correction in this context is exceedingly rare." This
diminished opportunity to correct erroneous commitments tilts
in favor of a higher standard for initial commitment.
Third, whereas few dispute that treatment for mental
illness can be very effective," even supporters admit that the
evidence regarding treatment effectiveness for sex offenders is
"not unequivocal."" Thus, it should hardly be surprising that
the median length of stay for involuntarily committed mental
patients is less than thirty days." In contrast, the
overwhelming majority of civilly committed sex offenders are
55. But see United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) ('The
statute challenged here [18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006) (sex offender commitment)] offers the
same sort of professional review and opportunity for correction of an erroneous
commitment [as in civil commitment], similarly reducing the need for the rigorous
reasonable doubt standard.").
56. Janus, supra note 52, at 195-206; see also La Fond, supra note 7, at 677 ('These
cases of mistakes or inaccurate predictions of dangerousness, false-positives to social
scientists, are simply locked away, out of sight and out of mind.").
57. See generally Philip A. Berger, Medical Treatment of Mental Illness, 200
SCIENCE 974 (1978). As to civil commitment in particular, see C. Katsakou & S. Priebe,
Outcomes of Involuntary Hospital Admission-A Review, 114 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 232, 238 (2006) ("The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that
patients show significant clinical improvement after involuntary treatment ... . The
number of participants who retrospectively report positive views on .. . their perceived
benefits from treatment in almost all studies is higher than those who explicitly express
negative views."); cf. Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
113, 115 (1960), available at http://www.cyc-net.orgcyc-online/cycol-0904-
mentalillness.html (questioning the effectiveness of medical action to solve psychosocial
problems "defined and established on nonmedical grounds").
58. Jill S. Levenson et al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community
Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES OF Soc. ISSUES & PUB. POL'Y 137, 143 (2007); see also
KURT BUMBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., UNDERSTANDING
TREATMENT FOR ADULTS AND JUVENILES WHO HAVE COMMITTED SEX OFFENSES 9-11
(2006), available at http://www.csom.org/CSOMResources/documents.html (summarizing
competing views); Dennis M. Doren & Pamela M. Yates, Effectiveness of Sex Offender
Treatment for Psychopathic Sexual Offenders, 52 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 234, 243 (2008) ("Whether psychopaths benefit from treatment cannot be
conclusively stated based on research to date."); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The
Size and Sign of Treatment Effects in Sex Offender Therapy, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
428, 428 (2003) ("We conclude that the effectiveness of psychological treatment for sex
offenders remains to be demonstrated."). But cf R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the
Collaborative Outcome Data Project on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for
Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 169, 181 (2002) ("Averaged across
all studies, the sexual offence recidivism rate was lower for the treatment groups (12.3%)
than the comparison groups (16.8%, 38 studies, unweighted average)."); Friedrich I~sel &
Martin Schmucker, The Effectiveness of Treatment for Sexual Offenders: A Comprehensive
Meta-Analysis, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 117, 117 (2005), ("Treated offenders
showed 6 percentage points or 37% less sexual recidivism than controls.").
59. See BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT 2 n.9 (2005); Janus, supra note 52, at
183 ("In fact, standard civil commitments are generally quite short, especially when
compared to police power commitments.").
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still in detention." These two related facts-less effective
treatment and much longer detention-both weigh in favor of a
higher standard of proof, the first by weakening the state's
interest in detention and the second by multiplying the burden
on individual liberty.
One similarity between mental illness and sex offender
civil commitment must be conceded: both require proof of
dangerousness, which the Addington Court worried could not
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." As Part II will show,
the Court's concern, in theory, can be addressed by setting a
low dangerousness threshold-the government would have to
meet a higher standard of proof, but what it must show would
be less. In addition, Addington preceded the development of
actuarial and other tools that can predict future
dangerousness with a reasonable degree of accuracy.2
Doctrinally, Addington also came before the Court's conclusion
that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a
prediction of future criminal conduct.""
But the important point is that the Court cared about
impossibility only because it believed the state's interest in
detaining the mentally ill was weighty. Balancing the public
and private interests is the touchstone. The state's interest in
preventing sexual violence is almost certainly even stronger
than the risks posed by most mentally ill individuals.' This
factor alone tilts toward a lower standard of proof for sex
60. See GOOKIN, supra note 12, at 1 (reporting that in 2006, 4,534 persons were held
under SVP laws and 494 persons were discharged or released); ef Aman Ahluwalia, Civil
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 4
CARDOzo PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 489, 495 (2006) (observing that longer periods of
detention "amount to a larger deprivation of the liberty of the sex offender").
61. One commentator has argued that the fact that many jurisdictions require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt for sex offender commitment negates that worry. Janus, supra
note 52, at 206. The problem with this excellent argument is that Addington rejected it.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430-31 (1979) ("That some states have chosen-
either legislatively or judicially-to adopt the criminal law standard gives no assurance
that the more stringent standard of proof is needed or is even adaptable to the needs of all
states." (footnote omitted)).
62. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk
Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1443, 1454-55 (2003) (tracing the start of actuarial risk assessment to the early
1990s).
63, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984).
64. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 39 n.38; see also TED R. MILLER, MARK A.
COHEN & BRIAN WIERSEMA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L INST. JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS
AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 9 (1996) (estimating costs of $87,000 per victimization
for rape and sexual assault and $24,000 for other assault with injury). Whether individual
state statutes are tailored to that interest is unclear. Stealing underwear from an
unoccupied house apparently can count as sexual violence in Kansas. See KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a02(e)(13) (2005); State v. Patterson, 963 P.2d 436, 437, 440 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
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offender civil commitment. If this factor outweighs the others
set forth above, then the Court should perhaps set the floor
lower than clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand,
if the other factors predominate, a higher standard may be
appropriate."
There is older case law strongly suggesting that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt may be required. In Specht v.
Patterson, a defendant convicted of indecent liberties was
sentenced not for that crime, but instead under an earlier
generation sex offender act to an indeterminate sentence of
one day to life." In effect, that is very similar to the current
generation of sex offender commitment laws." The Colorado
statute in Specht required a finding, above and beyond the
factual predicate for conviction, that the defendant
"constitute[dJ a threat of bodily harm to members of the public,
or [was] an habitual offender and mentally ill."" The defendant
challenged the statute on due process grounds for lack of a
hearing and for the allowance of hearsay evidence."
The challenge was successful. Because the indeterminate
sentence rested on a new finding of fact, the Court held, the
defendant was "entitled to the full panoply of the relevant
protections which due process guarantees in state criminal
proceedings."7
But is proof beyond a reasonable doubt one of these due
process protections? Specht did not specifically mention the
standard of proof.71 And the U.S. Supreme Court did not
squarely hold that due process required proof beyond a
65. Cf Daniel Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 1977 DETROIT C. L. REV. 209, 223 (same); Tsesis, supra note 18, at 259-66
(arguing that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of mental illness and
dangerousness for civil commitment given liberty interest at stake).
66. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 607 (1967).
67. Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 207/40 (LexisNexis 2000), with Specht,
386 U.S. at 607.
68. Specht, 386 U.S. at 607 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (1963)).
69. Id. at 608.
70. Id. at 609 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302,
312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
71. One commentator has argued that the Colorado statute required only a
preponderance. Constitutional Law-Procedural Due Process-Pennsylvania Supreme
Court Holds Sentence-Enhancement Provisions of "Megan's Law" Unconstitutional-
Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 792 (2000),
113 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2143 n.43 (2000) [hereinafter Recent Case]. Presumably, that
argument is based on the statutory language that authorized the indeterminate sentence
if the trial court was "of the opinion" that the requirements were met. Specht, 386 U.S. at
607 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 (1963)). But that language says nothing
about the required strength of opinion, and the important point in any event is that the
standard of proof was not argued or discussed. See id. at 607-11.
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reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings until three years
later in In re Winship." This omission and timing have led
some to conclude that Specht does not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."
The failure of Specht to discuss the standard of proof is a
serious objection: Specht is therefore suggestive, not
determinative.' The timing objection is less significant. The
Court in Winship made clear that it was confirming' a long-
existing due process requirement, not creating a new one: "The
requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early
years as a Nation."76 The Court cited nine opinions starting in
1881 in support of the proposition that "it has long been
assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable
doubt is constitutionally required."
The "full panoply" language in Specht was originally
penned by the Third Circuit.7" At the time it was written, there
is little question that it included proof beyond a reasonable
72. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
73. E.g., United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 676-79 (10th Cir. 1982) (discussing
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for sentencing, not civil commitment); Recent
Case, supra note 71, at 2143 (explaining that the Specht Court "simply did not consider
the reasonable-doubt issue").
74. See Carol Veneziano & Louis Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal Trends in the
Disposition of Sex Crimes: Implications for Theory, Research, and Policy, 15 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 210 (1987) ("A major procedural question left unanswered in Specht
is whether sexual psychopath proceedings require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for
commitment.").
75. Even skeptics use this word. See Recent Case, supra note 71, at 2143 (describing
"Winship's confirmation of the reasonable-doubt standard's constitutional status"
(emphasis added)). Indeed, federal courts in Colorado had recognized before Specht that
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was constitutionally required. Yates v. United
States, 316 F.2d 718, 725 (10th Cir. 1963). Colorado found the same requirement in its
state constitution before Winship. See People ex rel. Juhan v. Dist. Court for Jefferson
Cnty., 439 P.2d 741, 745 (Colo. 1968) ("As thus interpreted by the judiciary over the years
the due process clause of the state constitution includes the doctrine that the state must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.. .
76. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361.
77. Id. at 362. A passage from one of the cited cases (pre-Specht) is sufficient to
show that this line of argument is persuasive:
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the
first instance, and of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall
lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of producing the
evidence and convincing the factfinder of his guilt.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
78. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609 (1967) (quoting United States ex rel.
Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966)).
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doubt." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has expressly
rejected the timing argument." The U.S. Supreme Court has
had an opportunity to weigh in, but declined." At least one
justice has stated, based in part on Winship, that only proof
beyond a reasonable doubt can justify a lengthy or indefinite
deprivation of personal liberty.82
Lower court decisions after Winship and before Addington
favor the higher standard with one possible exception.8 ' A
Seventh Circuit case is representative of the majority position
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt:
We recognize that society has a substantial interest in
the protection of its members from dangerous deviant
sexual behavior. But when the stakes are so great for the
individual facing commitment, proof of sexual
dangerousness must be sufficient to produce the highest
recognized degree of certitude."
Note that this is the same balancing test later followed in
Addington.5
On the other hand, the Second Circuit held that "clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence" sufficed because
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt "would either
prevent the application of such statutes except in the most
extreme cases or invite hypocrisy on the part of judges or
juries."86 But the word "unequivocal" suggests a standard even
higher than beyond a reasonable doubt, as Addington
79. See United States ex rel. Marelia v. Burke, 197 F.2d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 1952)
(concluding that the jury instruction, which stated that defendant "must be assumed
'innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt'," would certainly satisfy "any
constitutional obligation").
80. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 603 n.12 (Pa. 1999) ("We are not
unaware that Winship was decided after Specht. Nevertheless, it is without question that
the due process considerations articulated by the Court in Winship are part and parcel to
the 'full panoply of relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal
proceedings.'").
81. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89(1986).
82. Murel v. Balt. City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 365 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) (dangerousness was an element for
indefinite detention of juvenile).
83. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir.
1975); Roxanne Lieb, Vernon Quinsey & Lucy Berliner, Sexual Predators and Social
Policy, 23 CRiME & JUST. 43, 63 (1998).
84. Coughlin, 520 F.2d at 937; accord People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 354 (Cal.
1975) (en banc); People v. Pembrock, 342 N.E.2d 28, 29 (Ill. 1976); In re Andrews, 334
N.E.2d 15, 26-28 (Mass. 1975).
85. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) ("[W]e turn to a middle level
burden of proof that strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the
legitimate concerns of the state.").
86. Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 695 (2d Cir. 1978).
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observed." And the Second Circuit's concern that not enough
people would meet a high standard, decoupled from balancing,
18
is, as argued above, illegitimate.
What elements of Specht survive Addington?" The key point of
friction is that a broad reading of Specht and Winship would require
proof of sex offender dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt,
which Addington declined to require for mental illness civil
commitment. Prediction is difficult in both contexts, but that fact in
isolation was not the reason Addington resisted the higher
standard. Rather, it was because setting the bar too high had the
potential to thwart the state's strong interests in detaining and
treating the dangerous mentally ill. Ultimately, the standard of
proof question boils down to balancing.o
B. The Minimum Probability ofRecidivism
The Due Process Clause requires an affirmative finding of
dangerousness for preventive detention.91 What that means in
the sex offender commitment case is unclear." Again, my focus
is on likelihood of recidivism, not other components of
dangerousness (e.g., magnitude of the predicted harm)."
Notwithstanding three major U.S. Supreme Court cases
addressing the constitutionality of sex offender commitment,
87. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432 ("The term 'unequivocal,' taken by itself, means
proof that admits of no doubt, a burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in
criminal cases." (footnote omitted)).
88. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
89. Specht has not been overruled by any other case, including Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1477-78 (2001).
90. This is another reason why criminal case law is not controlling. See Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-69 (1997) (rejecting the argument that a modern sex
offender commitment scheme was a criminal proceeding); Medina v. California, 505 U.S.
437, 443 (1992) ("In our view, the Mathews balancing test does not provide the
appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which, like the
one at bar [governing burden of proof and presumption of competency], are part of the
criminal process."). Hendricks did not overrule Specht because nothing in Specht turned
on the civil versus criminal distinction. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967)
("These commitment proceedings whether denominated civil or criminal are subject .. . to
the Due Process Clause.").
91. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-83 (1992); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
92. David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural Science: The
'Substantial Lack of Volitional Control' Requirement in Civil Commitments, 2 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RiSK 309, 315 (2003); ef WINICK, supra note 59, at 45 ("[T]he Supreme
Court has never clarified how likely the danger must be to the individual or to others that
civil commitment is designed to prevent... ."); Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness:
Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 61, 65 (1999) (same).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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the minimum probability of harm has not been squarely
decided. The first major case is Hendricks." In rejecting a
substantive due process challenge to the Kansas SVP statute,
the Court emphasized that the statute required "a likelihood of
[sexually violent behavior] in the future if the person is not
incapacitated."" Then, as now, Kansas did not define how
great that likelihood had to be." This suggests that any
likelihood may be enough, but the facts of the case do not
support such a sweeping holding." Essentially every sex
offender has a greater-than-zero risk of recidivism. That may
justify longer criminal sentences, but cannot be enough for
indefinite civil commitment.98
The Supreme Court said nearly this five years later in
Crane." Although the Court did not directly address the
likelihood of recidivism, it did so indirectly by holding that sex
offender civil commitment requires "proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior."'00 To be sure, a sex offender could be
in perfect control of his behavior and still choose to reoffend.
But reoffense is presumably much more likely for sex offenders
with control problems. And society cares little about control for
its own sake-the primary goal is to prevent sexual violence,
not to treat volitional defects.o' In sum, an overly broad
reading of Hendricks would set no floor on likelihood of
recidivism, but a functional interpretation of Crane rebuts that
reading.
The latest installment in the SVP trilogy is United States
v. Comstock.o2 The question decided was whether the federal
government had the power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to enact its SVP statute.' The Court assumed, without
94. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346.
95. Id. at 357-58.
96. Cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (2005) (stating that "likely to engage in repeat
acts of sexual violence" means "of such a degree as to pose a menace").
97. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360 ("Hendricks even conceded that, when he
becomes 'stressed out,' he cannot 'control the urge' to molest children.").
98. See id. at 358 (upholding Kansas SVP law in part because "it narrows the class
of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their
dangerousness").
99. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) ("We do not agree with the State,
however, insofar as it seeks to claim that the Constitution permits commitment of the
type of dangerous sexual offender considered in Hendricks without any lack-of-control
determination.").
100. Id. at 413.
101. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367 (suggesting that treatment may be "an ancillary
purpose").
102. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
103. Id. at 1956.
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deciding, that the statute did not violate the Due Process Clause.o4
Even though due process is the most likely source of a minimum
recidivism rate hurdle, the Comstock Court bolstered my reading of
Crane: "Congress could have reasonably concluded that federal
inmates who suffer from a mental illness that causes them to 'have
serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct,' [18
U.S.C.] § 4247(a)(6), would pose an especially high danger to the
public if released."o'0 The link between serious lack of control and
high risk of recidivism is now explicit.
State statutes and judicial opinions have set the probability of
recidivism bar at different heights. Constitutional challenges to
those bars have had mixed success. The California Supreme Court,
in rejecting one sex offender's argument, said: "we do not discern
that due process limits the involuntary civil commitment of
dangerous mentally disordered offenders only to those persons who
are more likely than not to reoffend."os The court distinguished
prior California case law cited above requiring "highly likely" harm
as directed solely to the standard of proof, not the dangerousness
hurdle. 07
In contrast, the State of Minnesota lost making the same
argument as the sex offender in California, but the Minnesota
Supreme Court in In re Linehan held that the "more likely than
not" standard was too low: "The due process clauses of both the
federal and state constitutions require that future harmful sexual
conduct must be highly likely in order to commit a proposed patient
under the [Sexually Dangerous Persons] Act."' The court grounded
its holding squarely on Addington:
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1961 (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006)).
106. People v. Ghilotti, 27 Cal. 4th 888, 924 (2002); see also People v. Roberge, 62
P.3d 97, 100-02 (Cal. 2003) (extending Ghilotti's holding from screening to the trial-
the final stage of the SVPA commitment process); cf. United States v. Hunt, 643 F.
Supp. 2d 161, 177-80 (D. Mass. 2009) (similarly rejecting the "more likely than not"
hurdle, but not on constitutional law grounds); Scott v. State, 895 N.E.2d 369, 375-
76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the argument that "likely" requires a finding of
more likely than not or to require something more than a 50% chance);
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 2002) (explaining that "likely"
does not implicate "the statistical probability inherent in the definition of 'more
likely than not'").
107. Ghilotti, 27 Cal. 4th at 924 n.15.
108. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Minn. 1996) (emphasis added), vacated sub
nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), reaffirmed, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn.
1999); accord Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (explaining that
preventative detention requires a "high probability of serious harm"). But see Beasley v.
Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590, 600 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) ("[Wie see
nothing ... to lead to the Minnesota court's conclusion that the finding of future




The individual should not be asked to share equally with
society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
individual is significantly greater than any possible harm
to the state." Addington, 441 U.S. at 427 . ... If the state
were to require only a 10% probability of dangerousness
(the fact to be demonstrated) and a clear and convincing
evidence standard (say, a 75% degree of certainty), then
the demand of due process that the citizen not share
equally the risk of error would be undermined.
Addington's holding was partly motivated by substantive
concerns about the preservation of individual liberty. See
Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 433 .. .. Hence, the error
that due process seeks to avoid is a false prediction of
future harmful conduct, and not only a prediction that is
less accurate than the statutory standard prescribed by
the legislature.o
In In re Detention of Brooks, the Court of Appeals of
Washington (later affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court)
distinguished In re Linehan."o It reasoned that because Washington
required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "the term 'likely' can be
given its ordinary meaning [more probably than not] without the
risk of falling below the constitutionally required minimum of clear
and convincing evidence.""' The Supreme Court of Iowa agreed in
In re Detention of Williams, adding a balancing analysis: the sex
offender's "interest in freedom from restraint is matched by the
State's equally compelling interest in protecting society from a
person prone to sexually assaulting children.""2
To understand and evaluate these divergent opinions, one
must first make sense of the relationship between standards of
proof and probability of recidivism thresholds. It is to this task
that the next Part is devoted.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STANDARDS OF PROOF AND
PROBABILITY THRESHOLDS
The relationship between standards of proof and
recidivism risk thresholds has been described as "intricate and
109. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 180 (emphasis added); accord Nicholas Scurich &
Richard John, The Normative Threshold for Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50
JURIMETRICS 425, 442-443 (2010) ("Because Addington incontrovertibly codified the CCE
standard to govern civil commitment, and the CCE standard embodies a preference for
false negatives relative to false positives, it mathematically follows that the posterior
probability of violence must exceed 50% to constitutionally justify commitment.").
110. In re Detention of Brooks, 973 P.2d 486, 491 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), affd in
relevant part, 36 P.3d 1034, 1044-47 (Wash. 2001) (en banc).
111. Id.
112. In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 457-59 (Iowa 2001).
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complex.""' Other commentators claim that the two standards
are independent: "We reject on logical grounds any tie between
standard of proof and the level of prediction necessary to
justify preventive detention or any lesser intrusion on the
individual's liberty.""' This section and the next will show that
the two standards are constitutionally intertwined, even if
logically distinct."'
A. A Graphical Explanation of the Relationship
Start with the minimum likelihood of future sexual
violence. Five jurisdictions require a showing that such
conduct is "more likely than not" (or greater than 50%)."' The
best evidence of recidivism comes from actuarial risk
assessment instruments."' Such instruments assign points to
various offender and offense attributes, sum the points, and
provide estimated recidivism rates for different point totals."
Of course, actuarial instruments cannot predict the future.
But, less obviously, neither can they assess an individual's risk
with precision. Estimates of risk themselves come with error.
For example, falling into the risk category nearest 50% using
the most widely used instrument, the Static-99, " corresponds
113. John Monahan & David B. Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in
Civil Commitment, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 41 (1978).
114. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns
and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 393, 424 n.67 (1986).
115. For an excellent earlier explication of the relationship between the two
standards using Bayesian methodology, see Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 41-44. My
approach is more "frequentist." See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint:
The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 497, 505-09 (2004) (providing an explanation of the frequentist approach
compared with the Bayesian approach).
116. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4) (West 2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West
2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(n)
(West 2007); In re G.H., 781 N.W.2d 438, 445 (Neb. 2010).
117. See Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Field Validity of the Static-99 and MnSOST-R
Among Sex Offenders Evaluated for Civil Commitment as Sexually Violent Predators, 15
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 278, 279 (2009) ("ARAIs designed to predict sexual reoffense
(d = .67) clearly outperformed unstructured professional judgment (d = .42)."); Debra A.
Pinals, Chad E. Tillbrook & Denise L. Mumley, Violence Risk Assessment, in SEX
OFFENDERS: IDENTIFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND LEGAL ISSUES 49, 54
(Fabian M. Saleh et al. eds., 2009). But see Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical
Assessments of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 409, 414-16 (2001).
118. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 62, at 1454; Gina M. Vincent, Shannon M.
Maney & Stephen D. Hart, The Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments in Sex
Offenders, in SEX OFFENDERS: IDENTIFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT, TREATMENT, AND
LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 117, at 70, 72.
119. See Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of
Sex Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SExuAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 425, 434,
438, 440 (2007); Jacqueline Waggoner, Richard Wollert & Elliot Cramer, A Respecification
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120to a 48.8% chance of violent recidivism within five years.
Roughly speaking, there is a 95% chance that the true rate is
somewhere between 42.2% and 55.4%."' This so-called
"confidence interval" reflects prediction error."' What is true
for the instrument is true for any type or combination of
evidence: the precise risk level of an individual is generally
unknowable."'
The level of prediction error associated with the Static-99
is disputed. The figures given above come from the developers
of the instrument.124 One group containing perhaps the
strongest critics of the Static-99 estimated a 95% confidence
interval on an earlier version's 52% predicted recidivism rate
of between 6% and 95%.125 The true answer probably lies
somewhere in between. An independent instrument has one
predicted recidivism category estimating a 44% rate with a
95% confidence interval of 29% to 61%.126
With certain simplifying assumptions,'2  one can plot
recidivism predictions of 50%-right at the "more likely than
of Hanson's Updated Static-99 Experience Table that Controls for the Effects of Age on
Sexual Recidivism Among Young Offenders, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 305, 305-06
(2008).
120. Static-99R Violent Recidivism Estimates, STATIC-99 CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/static-99RViolentRecidEstimates2ol-O4-29.pdf (last
visited Feb. 1, 2013).
121. Id.
122. Again, I adopt frequentist terminology. The basic conclusions would most likely
hold applying Bayesian techniques. See Adelman, supra note 115, at 505-09; M. J.
Bayarri & J.O. Berger, The Interplay of Bayesian and Frequentist Analysis, 19 STAT. Scl.
58, 71 (2004) ("Bayesian and frequentist asymptotic answers are often (but not always)
the same."); Gauri Sankar Datta et al., Bayesian Prediction with Approximate Frequentist
Validity, 28 ANNALS OF STAT. 1414, 1414 (2000) ("It is . . . shown that, for any given prior,
it may be possible to choose an interval whose Bayesian predictive and frequentist
coverage probabilities are asymptotically matched."). See generally D.H. Kaye, Apples and
Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 54,
62 (1987); Nicholas Scurich & Richard S. John, A Bayesian Approach to the Group Versus
Individual Prediction Controversy in Actuarial Risk Assessment, 36 LAw & HUM. BEHAv.
237, 239 (2012).
123. But at least with the instruments, one can estimate the error. See Janus &
Prentky, supra note 62, at 1493-94.
124. Static-99 Documents, STATIC-99 CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.static99.org/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2012).
125. See Stephen D. Hart, Christine Michie & David J. Cooke, Precision of Actuarial
Risk Assessment Instruments: Evaluating the 'Margins of Error' of Group v. Individual
Predictions of Violence, 190 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY s60, s63-64 (2007).
126. Douglas Mossman, Analyzing the Performance of Risk Assessment Instruments:
A Response to Vrieze and Grove (2007), 32 LAW & HUm. BEHAv. 279, 287 tbl.2 (2007)
(measuring probabilities of recidivism associated with the GEVALT scores).
127. The Figures assume a normal error distribution. For my argument, the only
necessary assumption is that the estimated recidivism rate be "median-unbiased"--in
other words, that the estimate is too low half the time and too high the other half.
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not" threshold-under the three different error levels
described below (Figure 1). Each line represents the frequency
distribution of the actual recidivism rate.
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Predicted Probability of Recidivism
Tighter confidence intervals are reflected in narrower
distributions around the prediction. In the tallest distribution
(solid black line; lowest prediction error), one can be relatively
confident that the true risk level is close to 50%. Not so for the
flattest distribution (gray line; highest prediction error).
However, the amount of prediction error does not matter if the
standard of proof is merely preponderance (POE).m2 Half of the
area lies above the 50% cut-off in all three distributions-in other
words, it is "more likely than not" that the actual probability of
recidivism is above 50%.
Heightened standards of proof complicate matters. Take the
intermediate level of prediction error (Figure 1 dotted line),
holding constant the "more likely than not" risk threshold.
Assume that proof by clear and convincing evidence (CCE)
requires 75% certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt (BRD)
requires 90%. These were, in fact, the average values observed in
a survey of judges." The effective threshold rises with the
128. Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 161, 173 (2011).
129. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or
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standard of proof: to 58% for clear and convincing evidence and
65% for beyond a reasonable doubt (Figure 2)."'o This happens
because the heightened standards of proof in effect require that a
greater percentage of the distribution exceed the 50% cut-off. For
example, a prediction of 58% shifts the distribution to the right
so that 75% of it exceeds 50% and therefore meets the CCE
standard.
Figure 2. The Impact of Standard of Proof
-POE 50% 58% 65%
--- CCE
- BRD %
beon a resnal doubt (90 cetiny tha th se offender
predicton err reectely Prequbiies af 58%cpdictdecdiis
rate (Figure 3). The intermediate prediction error level generates
the 66% figure already seen in the previous figure. And the
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1825 tbl.2, 1328 tbl.5 (1982) (survey
of judges); see also Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (calculating mean, median, and mode for clear and convincing
evidence based on the McCauliff surveys).
130. This illustrates and quantifies what others have observed. See, e.g., Christopher
Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 51 (2003) (defining
dangerousness as "Hikely" and stating that this definition "has the effect of lowering the
state's burden, because it only requires that the government demonstrate by the requisite
standard (beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, etc.) that the person
is likely to offend").
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highest error level effectively sets the threshold at a 79%
likelihood of sexual violence. The greater the error, the higher
the recidivism threshold must be for a given standard of proof. As
the distribution flattens, it must be shifted further to the right to
ensure that the required 90% of the distribution stay above 50%.
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One implication of the foregoing is that the Brooks and
Williams cases discussed above may have gotten it right in
holding constitutional their statute's requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that recidivism was more likely
than not.'
The effective threshold (79%) is above 75% applying the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard with the greatest
prediction error (gray line). Again, the assumption was that
Addington requires clear and convincing evidence, which in
turn requires a net predicted probability of recidivism of 75%.
In contrast, unreported calculations generate a recidivism
threshold of 65% for the clear and convincing evidence
standard at this least reliable level of evidence. That is, of
course, below 75%, which suggests that Linehan also reached
the right result in striking down the combination of clear and
131. In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.3d 447, 457-59 (Iowa 2001); In re
Detention of Brooks, 36 P.3d 1034, 1044-47 (Wash. 2001).
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convincing evidence and a more-likely-than-not recidivism
threshold.13 2
B. The Logical Divide and Constitutional Connection
How can anyone argue that standard of proof is independent
of recidivism risk threshold? As shown above, they appear to be
closely related. A hint of an answer is in Williams's invocation of
"the State's.. . compelling interest in protecting society from a
person prone to sexually assaulting children.""' Other courts
describe the goal as "preventing future acts of sexual violence."'
This is an important distinction.
The first framing, which has been called the "bifurcated
proposal,"" effectively decouples the standard of proof from the
recidivism threshold." Any chance of recidivism can suffice,' and
the standard of proof, as described above, just reflects confidence
that the individual clears that bar.3 8 This approach is tailored to
reduce the risk and fear of sexual violence, not sexual violence
directly.39 An individual with a 1% chance of recidivism poses a risk
and generates fear. On the other hand, the second framing, or
"unitary approach," arguably requires an elevated risk level. 40
Locking up individuals with a 1% chance of recidivism does very
little to prevent future acts of sexual violence.
132. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 179-80 (Minn. 1996), vacated sub nom. Linehan
v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997).
133. In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d at 459.
134. State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Wis. 1995); cf United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 750 (1987) ("[The Government's general interest in preventing crime is
compelling... .").
135. Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 42.
136. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 143-44 (2006) (describing the bifurcated
approach as a "sleight[ ] of hand"); Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 42.
137. Cf Scurich & John, supra note 109, at 444 (according to this approach, all sex
offenders "have a 100% probability of being dangerous").
138. See Abrashkin, supra note 46, at 84 n.77. One commentator takes the bifurcated
approach a step further. Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the
Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators-A Due Process Analysis, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 594, 628 (1997) ("A subsequent finding that a person committed a
criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt, however, indicates a propensity toward
dangerous behavior. Sexual predator laws, therefore, adequately satisfy the due process
dangerousness requirement." (footnote omitted)).
139. Cf JEAN FLOUD & WARREN YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 49
(1982) (stating that the offender "being in the wrong by virtue of the risk he represents is
what entitles us to consider imposing on him the risk of unnecessary measures to save the
risk of harm to innocent victims").
140. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 43 (1997) (claiming that this standard
advocates that sex offender commitment schemes commit only sex offenders who are
'likely' or even 'highly likely' to recidivate.").
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Although a complete analysis of substantive due process is
outside the scope of this Article,' a few comments along these
lines will hopefully clarify the distinction between the two
approaches. Freedom from physical restraint is clearly a
fundamental liberty interest, so government deprivations of that
interest must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.4 2
Preventing sexual violence surely qualifies as a compelling state
interest." The unitary approach detains individuals whose risk
of recidivism outweighs their liberty interest and is therefore
narrowly tailored to prevent sexual violence.'"
The bifurcated approach is narrowly tailored to reduce risk
and fear. Some have suggested in other contexts that
substantiated fear can be a compelling interest.'45 In any event,
reducing the risk of sexual violence advances the compelling
interest of preventing sexual violence, but if the recidivism
threshold is low, many individuals will be committed who would
not have recidivated. Whether overinclusiveness of this type
violates the narrow-tailoring requirement is a difficult
constitutional question.46 If, as I argue, the standard of proof
141. Eric Janus has argued that substantive due process "might forbid lifetime
confinement of sex offenders for whom there is no reasonable likelihood of successful
treatment." Eric S. Janus, Treatment and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, in
PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAw, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY 119, 127 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. La Fond eds., 2003).
142. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) ("[The Due Process Clause
prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted)); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,
288 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "freedom from physical restraint" is
a fundamental liberty interest).
143. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) ("The government's
interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling.").
144. Cf Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical
Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 393, 413 (1986)
(suggesting that a low risk of recidivism does not outweigh an individual's liberty
interest).
145. See Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 937 F. Supp. 700, 706 & n.5
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (recognizing fear of school segregation as a potential compelling
interest); Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1996); State v. Mitchell, 485
N.W.2d 807, 818 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). But cf Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly."), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment protects "mere advocacy" as "distinguished from
incitement to imminent lawless action").
146. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Even narrow
tailoring in strict scrutiny analysis does not contemplate a perfect correspondence
between the means chosen to accomplish a compelling governmental interest."); Ian Ayres
& Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85
TEX. L. REV. 517, 575-82 (2007) (explaining criteria for the narrow tailoring inquiry);
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case law requires the unitary approach, it is a question we
may not need to answer.
The first major case in this line is Winship, which, as
noted above, confirmed that the Due Process Clause requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.' Suppose
New York decides that this high proof standard allows too
many murderers to escape justice. A new crime is created,
"murderish," the key element of which is that the defendant
"more likely than not" committed murder. That element (like
any others) would have to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."'8 There is little question that the U.S. Supreme Court
would strike down the statute as a transparent attempt to
undercut Winship."'
Or is there? Case law under Winship has been anything
but straightforward. The government must prove the elements
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt,' but not defenses''
or sentencing factors.' The dividing lines are unclear."' I will
not attempt to clarify them. Whether or not the Court would in
fact strike down the "murderish" statute as inconsistent with
Winship, it should. Otherwise, Winship is dead letter."
One might attempt to distinguish sex offender
commitment on the ground that dangerousness is forward
looking and therefore necessarily probabilistic, whereas the
hypothetical "murderish" is backward looking and either true
Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns"' Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1452-57
(2000); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1330
(2007) (suggesting that overinclusiveness might violate narrow tailoring).
147. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970).
148. Id. at 361.
149. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699 (1975) ("Winship is concerned with substance
rather than this kind of formalism."); see also Ronald Jay Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, The
Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law--An Examination of the Limits of
Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269, 290 (1977) ("Thus, the Court indicated that it
would not permit the states to undercut Winship with semantic gamesmanship.").
150. Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2688 (2010).
151. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 769 (2006).
152. United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010) (citing McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986)).
153. Clark, 548 U.S. at 770-79 (holding that certain evidence of mens rea can be
channeled into an insanity defense).
154. In addition, as noted above, civil and criminal standard of proof analysis has
diverged since Winship. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) ("In our view,
the Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the
validity of state procedural rules which, like the one at bar [governing burden of proof and
presumption of competency), are part of the criminal process."). The "murderish"
hypothetical is illustrative, not controlling.
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or false.m This is a false distinction. A future event will either
happen or not, and all evidence-both historical and
predictive-is probabilistic.'5 6
There is, however, a passage in Addington that can be
read to support the distinction. In the course of rejecting the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard for civil commitment, the
Court distinguished criminal proceedings on the ground that
"the basic issue is a straightforward factual question-did the
accused commit the act alleged?"' In contrast, dangerousness
assessments are "interpretlivel," "subjective," "impression [istic],"
and not "definite."'
This would seem to favor the bifurcated view, but context
is critical. Addington drew this distinction to support its
conclusion that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
dangerousness would probably be unattainable."' As the
discussion above illustrates, that conclusion only makes sense
if there is a minimum likelihood of recidivism. Setting the risk
threshold low enough could ensure that many sex offenders
clear the bar beyond a reasonable doubt." So, properly read,
this part of Addington supports both the questionable
historical-predictive distinction and the unitary approach.
But other parts of Addington can be read to directly
support the bifurcated approach. The first is the Court's
description of the government interest: "to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are
mentally ill.,"' A 1% chance of recidivism could be described as
a "dangerous tendency." Along the same lines, the Court
reasoned that "the State has no interest in confining
individuals involuntarily ... if they do not pose some danger to
themselves or others."' But the closest Addington comes to a
direct statement on the question is the following: "the
substantive standards for civil commitment may vary from
state to state."m'
155. See JEAN FLOUD & WARREN YOUNG, DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
47-48 (1982) ("Predictive judgments are inherently uncertain in a way that judgments of
past offenses are not.").
156. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 830 (8th ed. 2011); see also In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[All1 the factfinder can
acquire is a belief of what probably happened.").
157. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
158. Id. at 429-30.
159. See id. at 429.
160. See Miller & Morris, supra note 114, at 423.
161. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 431.
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In support of that last statement, Addington cites, inter
alia, a pathmarking article by John Monahan and David
Wexler.'" On one cited page the article asks, and suggests an
affirmative answer to, the key question: "Constitutionally,
must the deprivation of commitment be measured and
balanced in accordance with a formula that would take into
account both standards of proof and standards of commitment
[their term for recidivism risk threshold]?"'"' The article goes
on to observe that Addington, then on appeal, was "poorly
postured" because it concerned only the standard of proof.'"
In sum, Addington did not expressly choose between the
bifurcated and unitary approaches. Thus it left open a passage
to limbo. But Addington's balancing test, properly construed,
should close that door. To prove that point, the next part will
formalize the test.
IV. A FORMAL APPROACH TO BALANCING
According to the unitary approach, the possible outcomes
of a sex offender commitment proceeding are depicted in Table
1.




Yes True Positive False
(TP) Negative (FN)
No False Positive True Negative
(FP) (TN)
The bifurcated approach divides outcomes differently.'
Errors are measured not by reoffense, but by probability of
164. Id. (citing Monahan & Wexler, supra note 113, at 41-42).
165. Monahan & Wexler, supra note 113, at 41.
166. Id. at 41-42.
167. Of Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 38-39 & tbl. 1 (examining risk contingency,
erroneous commitment decisions, and prediction standards).
168. Id. at 38-40.
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reoffense."' For example, a True Positive could be defined as
committing someone with a 51% likelihood of recidivism,
whether or not that person would actually have reoffended.
Releasing someone with a 49% risk of recidivism is a True
Negative, even if that person reoffends. Again, the bifurcated
approach is tailored to reduce risk and fear; the unitary
approach to reduce sexual violence.
Addington does not define what it means by "erroneous
commitment,"" but its balancing test implicitly adopts the
unitary approach."' One way to conceptualize the Supreme
Court's civil standard of proof jurisprudence is: how strong
must the evidence supporting the government interest be to
justify a deprivation of the individual interest?172 If it were just
about strength of evidence and all government interests
counted equally, then nothing would prevent the "murderish"
hypothetical posed above.
To the contrary, Addington requires an express weighing
of the government interest against the private interest.'73 The
government plainly has less interest in committing sex
offenders with a 1% chance of recidivism than those with a
75% chance. And the individual interest in avoiding
imprisonment does not vary with the predicted risk of
recidivism."' Fear unmoored from risk should not be a
sufficient justification for indefinite detention."' To be sure,
the unitary approach gives the standard of proof both a
169. See Monahan & Wexler, supra note 113, at 38.
170. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-29 (1979).
171. Some have argued that this balancing is a mistake. See Miller & Morris,
supra note 114, at 424 ("[1It is a mistake to decide the balance between the risk to the
community and the restrictions on the individual in terms of the burden of proof.").
172. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (in selecting minimum
proof standard, the Court balances "the private interests affected by the proceeding;
the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing
governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure").
173. See id. at 755. At least one commentator implicitly disagrees. See
Bochnewich, supra note 20, at 299 ("So long as the intrusion on an individual's rights
is supported by a legitimate government interest, then it is simply a matter of policy
where the line is drawn between the individual's rights, and those of society.").
174. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
175. See In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 197 (Minn. 1996) (Tomljanovich, J.,
dissenting) ("(A] state cannot incarcerate a person simply because it fears the
person's future acts."), vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997);
see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty."); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2658 (2011) ("But the fear
that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information cannot justify
content-based burdens on speech." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
883
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
procedural and substantive component,' 6 but that is implicit in
the Court's balancing test.'
The choice of 75% was not arbitrary. As discussed above,...
that is the level of certainty typically associated with the clear
and convincing evidence standard required by Addington.
Notwithstanding Addington, however, Part I argued that neither
the minimum standard of proof nor the minimum risk level have
been established. The remainder of this section will attempt to
quantify the minimum probability of recidivism for sex offender
commitment.
The Court has generally engaged in ad hoc balancing and
comparison to prior cases rather than systematic weighing of
interests. Part I essentially applied the Court's case law
approach and found it to be indeterminate. Justice Harlan
suggested a more formal methodology in his concurrence to
Winship, recommending a seminal article by John Kaplan."' The
key equation for present purposes was clarified a year later by
Alan Cullison.'5 s The probability threshold that maximizes social
welfare equals:
1(UTP-UFN +
(Ur-Ur +1UTN - UFP)
where U is the total utility, or contribution to well being, of the
outcome in the subscript.m The formula is not without critics, but
176. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5122 (2d ed. 2010 Supp.) (describing "presumptions,"
including standards of proof, as "procedural rules, reflect[ing substantive policies");
Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of
the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 291 n.439 (1987) ("The clear and
convincing evidentiary burden is certainly a substantively oriented procedural rule.");
see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997) ("[Iln its revisions of prior law to
change standards of proof and persuasion in a way favorable to a State, the statute goes
beyond 'mere' procedure to affect substantive entitlement to relief."); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Sentencing Procedures: Where Does Responsibility Lie?, 4 FED. SENT. R. 247,
250 (1992) ("[Sltandards of proof are more substantive than procedural."). But see
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 (characterizing standards of proof as "procedural"); but cf
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 546 (3d ed. 2006) ("Substantive due process,
as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking
away a person's life, liberty, or property.").
177. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 180; Janus & Meehl,
supra note 20, at 43, offer additional functional arguments for the unitary approach.
178. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
179. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 n.2 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing John
Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071-77
(1968)).
180. See Alan D. Cullison, Probability Analysis of Judicial Fact-Finding: A
Preliminary Outline of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 538, 564-71 (1969).
181. See id. at 564-66. The formula is one way to operationalize Christopher
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even the most prominent of them, Laurence Tribe, excludes from
the scope of his critique situations, like estimating the
probability of recidivism, where mathematical methods are
appropriate and unavoidable.182
The equation embodies the Addington balancing test. (U,,,)
reflects the harm of erroneous commitment, which, given the
generally short term of mental illness commitment, consists
primarily of "stigma."'" Conversely, a False Negative, the
"release of a genuinely mentally ill person,"" inflicts both
social and individual harm (U,,). Correct commitments serve
the government and individual interests in providing needed
treatment (U,).'" Finally, the government has a strong
interest in preserving scarce resources for those in need: "the
State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if
they are not mentally ill" (U,,). 18 Addington expressly
considered each of the four utilities; the equation tells how
best to balance them.
The bifurcated approach would require a more complicated
formula. The utility of outcomes would depend on the risk levels
of individuals. Locking up a high-risk individual reduces risk and
fear more than locking up a low-risk individual. In effect, the
probability threshold would figure into both sides of the
equation. This is another argument against the bifurcated
approach: the Court's comparison of utilities clearly fails to
include this additional layer of complexity.
Slobogin's proportionality principle. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 136, at 106 ("The
proportionality principle requires that the degree of danger be roughly proportionate to
the proposed government intervention."). Closely related is the famous Learned Hand
formula, the application of which has been advocated in this context. Abhi Raghunathan,
Note, "Nothing Else But Mad": The Hidden Costs of Preventive Detention, 100 GEO. L.J.
967, 993-95 (2012).
182. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1338-39, 1382-86 (1971); see also Scurich & John, supra
note 109, at 432 ("Actuarial evidence, however, presents a unique situation because it is
inherently statistical, so it might be exempt from many of the criticisms relevant to
decision theory in the trial process."). Others have pointed out that the formula cannot
select among preset standards of proof, as opposed to generating unconstrained
probability thresholds. Vars, supra note 129, at 15-16; see also Ronald J. Allen, The
Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases
After Patterson v. New York, 76 IIICH. L. REV. 30, 47 n.65 (1977).
183. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
184. Id. at 429.
185. Id. at 426.
186. Id.; accord Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1992) (expressly
considering four utilities in the Addington/Mathews balancing test).
187. Tribe identified this problem in the criminal context. Tribe, supra note 182, at
1382-83 & n.168.
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How does one quantify the relevant utilities?'" Of course, this
assumes that quantification is possible, an assumption that some
readers will reject. After all, how can one measure the harm from
rape or child molestation?'" My response is that while perfect
measurement is impossible, imprecise measurement is better than
no measurement. And without reducing to common terms the
utilities of the outcomes, the required balancing test is impossible.'
As noted above, the efficacy of treatment for sex offenders
has not been established"' and "there is no reason that treatment
could not be provided in prison,', 2  so I will assume that
incapacitation is the only relevant government interest served by
sex offender commitment. This also disregards any deterrent
effect commitment might have. Deterrence is not the purpose of
sex offender civil commitment."' Indeed, the central rationale is
that deterrence of sex offenders is difficult, if not impossible."
This is evident in the Supreme Court's holding that a
prerequisite for sex offender civil commitment is "serious
difficulty in controlling behavior.""'
188. For a useful, nonquantified tabulation, see David L. Faigman, Judges as
"Amateur Scientists," 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 tbl.2 (2006).
189. See John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 588 (2006) ("The values
that Mathews calls on the courts to balance [in case of indefinite detention of suspected
terrorists] seem obviously difficult-if not impossible-to measure against any common
metric."); cf Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562-63 (2002) (criticizing
cost-benefit analysis in the environmental context).
190. Cf David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 652 (1994) ("Although constitutional values do not
lend themselves to a simple calculus, they are amenable to comparison and rough
measurement on a single scale."). Some have argued that balancing is an inappropriate
mode of judicial decisionmaking. E.g., Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the
Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987).
191. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
192. Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76
B.U. L. REv. 113, 140 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of
Sentencing: The Modern Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1127, 1142-44 (2011).
193. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2011) (stating that "care and treatment"
through a separate involuntary civil commitment process is necessary to address the
special needs of sexually violent predators); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-63
(reasoning that the civil commitment statute at issue was not created to serve the
criminal law objectives of retribution or deterrence because persons committed under the
statute were "unlikely to be deterred").
194. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2011) (discussing the Kansas legislature's
findings that sexually violent predators are "an extremely dangerous group ... who are
likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence if not treated for their mental
abnormality or personality disorder"); Slobogin, supra note 208 at 1142, 1144 (discussing
sex offenders as a category of people "eligible for detention in a noncriminal system on the
ground that they are undeterrable by criminal sanction").
195. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
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The four utilities can be broken down into the following
constituent costs. A True Positive includes at a minimum the
government's cost of detention.'" A False Positive includes both
the government's cost of detention and the cost to the individual
of false imprisonment.' A True Negative is costless."' A False
Negative leads to repeat sexual violence." I omit adjudication
costs since they are incurred in each of the four outcomes and
therefore cancel out in the equation.
Starting with the largest cost, a False Negative permits at
least one act of sexual violence. That is what actuarial
instruments have been designed to predict.
200 The costs of the
three most serious sex crimes have been estimated as follows (in
2011 dollars): Rape-Murder, $4,576,614; Rape and Sexual
Assault (Adult Victim), $135,430; and Sexual Assault (Child
Victim), $154,11.20' These costs can be weighted by their relative
frequency.20 2 Limiting the analysis to these most serious
offenses-and excluding less serious, potential trigger crimes like
exhibitionism and underwear theft"0
3 -tilts the scale toward the
government and toward a lower predicted recidivism threshold.
This conservative approach is appropriate because the goal of
196. See Faigman, supra note 188, at 1214 tbl.2 (listing the four utilities and their




200. See Pinals, Tillbrook, & Mumley, supra note 117, at 53.
201. TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN, & BRIAN WIERSEMA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 9 tbl.2 (1996),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/Abstract.aspx?id=155282. These are
the federal government's own numbers. Id. Using them is consistent with my approach of
making every assumption in favor of the government. Inflation adjustments for 2011 were
made with Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S.
BUREAU LAB. STATS., http/www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (Last visited Jan.
22, 2013).
202. Another approach would be to calculate separate thresholds depending on the
seriousness of the offense. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 123, at 1494 (discussing
courts' preference to evaluate the probability aspect of risk based on the severity of the
predicted behavior); Larry Laudan & Harry D. Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal
Standard ofProof- Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of Trial Outcomes, 7 INT'L COMM.
EVID. 1, 1, 29 (2009) (questioning whether differing standards of proof are needed based
on the severity of each crime). With the exception of rape-murder, which is extremely
rare, the differences in cost among the three most serious offenses do not seem to justify
this complication. See MILLER, COHEN, & WIERSEMA, supra note 201, at 3 (showing that
between 1987-1990, rape-murder victims totaled 265, whereas sexual assault for adults
and children totaled 1,133,000 and 185,000, respectively). I did not find cost estimates for
less serious offenses. And, in any event, certainty of reoffense seems to me insufficient to
justify the indefinite detention of noncontact sex offenders, as opposed to criminal
sanctions after the fact.
203. See supra note 64.
888 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [50:3
this Article is to set as firm a constitutional floor as possible."
This limitation also determines the first component of
dangerousness by assuming a very high magnitude of harm."'
Research shows that repeat sex crimes are underdetected, so
I multiply crime costs by the ratio of detected and undetected
crimes to detected crimes."' Doing so lowers the minimum
standard of proof based on unobserved activity, which is arguably
unfair.2 07 But again, the guiding principle is to resolve any close
calls in favor of the government. That said, the extent of
underdetection is by definition unknown and hotly disputed.208 It
must be conceded that different assumptions on this point could
substantially alter the resulting minimum risk threshold.
Adjusting for underdetection reflects the third component of
dangerousness: frequency of harm.209
It is expensive to incapacitate sex offenders, and this cost
affects the utilities of both True and False Positives. "A good rule
of thumb is that it costs about $100,000 per person to keep
someone committed in an institution for a year as an SVP."'1o
This estimate matches almost exactly the $94,017 mean
204. See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07 Civ. 2935(GEL), 2007 WL
4115936, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007) (stating that deference to the legislature is
appropriate when engaging in Mathews balancing). But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 754 (1982) ("Unlike the Court's right-to-counsel rulings, its decisions concerning
constitutional burdens of proof have not turned on any presumption favoring any
particular standard. To the contrary, the Court has engaged in a straight-forward
consideration of the factors identified in Eldridge to determine whether a particular
standard of proof in a particular proceeding satisfies due process.").
205. See supra text accompanying note 20.
206. A. Nicholas Groth, Robet E. Longo, & J. Bradley McFadin, Undetected
Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 450, 452 tbl.1,
454 tbl.2 (1982); Murder Mysteries: Investigating America's Unsolved Homicides, SCRIPPS
HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, http://projects.scrippsnews.com/agazine/murder-mysteries/
(last visited Jan. 16, 2013) (in my calculations unsolved serves as a rough proxy for
undetected homicides). Based on these two sources, I multiplied the predicted number of
murders by 1.6, rapes by 2.9, and child molestation by 3.8.
207. See John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute: Law or
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 755, 775 (1992)
("But, even if it is true that sex crimes (like most other crimes) are underreported and
that some sex offenders commit many sex crimes, these broad-brush claims do not
establish that mental health professionals can accurately identify which, if any, offender
will commit serious sex crimes.").
208. See Dawn J. Post, Preventive Victimization: Assessing Future Dangerousness in
Sexual Predators for Purposes of Indeterminate Civil Commitment, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB. L.
& POLY 177, 241 (1999) (reporting more severe under-detection); Mark R. Weinrott &
Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991) (same).
209. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 37 (discussing the four components of
dangerousness).
210. JOHN Q. LA FOND, PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: How SOCIETY SHOULD COPE
WITH SEX OFFENDERS 150 (2005).
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calculated by a 2006 comprehensive review of jurisdictions."' The
lowest annual cost per detainee was $41,176, in South
Carolina.2 12 It is unclear whether the state can provide
constitutionally adequate conditions at this low level..2" And
these figures do not include construction or court costs.214
Nonetheless, to further favor the government, I assume the
minimum state expenditure level used by South Carolina, which
is $45,943 in 2011 dollars.
As noted above, a False Positive carries another important
cost: the erroneous deprivation of liberty. Although by no means
a perfect analog, monetary awards for falsely imprisoned
criminal defendants provide some indication of the value society
places on freedom from physical restraint. Two recent law review
articles compile award amounts, along with duration
information, for seventeen falsely imprisoned individuals.2 1 1 Of
those, twelve were imprisoned for a year or more and were in the
United States; the median award in 2011 dollars was $367,577
per year. The low award, which is the one I use, was $68,045 per
2 16
year.
The final assumption needed is the number of years the
commitment lasts. Obviously, both the direct costs of
imprisonment and the harm of false imprisonment rise with the
duration. As noted above, the vast majority of detainees are still
in custody, so it is impossible to estimate the average length of
stay." I use five years. First, five years is generally the shortest
follow-up period used by actuarial instruments. 21 1 This is
significant because actuarial instruments are the best evidence of
recidivism risk. Sex offenders are (or should be) committed
because the instrument estimates a risk of recidivism within five
211. GOOKIN, supra note 12, at 5 exhibit 3.
212. Id. Actually, Texas was lower, but it is 100% outpatient. Id.
213. See Abby Goodnough & Monica Davey, A Record of Failures at Center for Sex
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at A16 (reporting on Florida, which spends just
slightly more than South Carolina).
214. GOOKIN, supra note 12, at 6 exhibit 4.
215. Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 43-44 nn. 30, 32, & 49 n.63; Mordachai Halpert &
Boaz Sangero, From a Plane Crash to the Conviction of an Innocent Person: Why Forensic
Science Evidence Should Be Inadmissible Unless It Has Been Developed as a Safety-
Critical System, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 89-90 & n.179 (2009).
216. These awards did not reflect the stigma of being labeled a "sexually violent
predator," so using them further tilts the scale in favor of the government.
217. GOOKIN, supra note 12, at 1 (reporting 4,534 persons held under SVP laws and
494 discharged or released); John Q. La Fond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator
Law, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 468, 498-99 (1998).
218. See Boccaccini et. al., supra note 117, at 300-01 (discussing use of the Static-99
to calculate recidivism rates and defining "recidivism" as "reoffense within 5 years").
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years above the threshold."' Incapacitation must last for five
years to eliminate that risk.220 In effect, this puts an outer limit of
five years on the imminence component of dangerousness.22
The second reason for selecting five years is the experience
in Minnesota, one of the first jurisdictions to adopt a current-
generation sex offender commitment statute.' "The Minnesota
SVP program itself is designed to be completed in a minimum of
four years."223 However, most patients are unable to complete the
program in the minimum period."' If one very optimistically
assumes that a sizable fraction take only one additional year,
then the median might be five years.
We are now ready to work back to the Kaplan-Cullison
equation. U, equals the government's cost of detaining an
individual for five years ($229,715225). U is the same number,
plus an award for a five-year erroneous deprivation of liberty
($569,938). A True Negative has no cost. The cost of a single act
of sexual violence, adjusted to reflect underdetection ($415,445),
is equal to U,,. Plugging these values into the equation generates
an optimal probability threshold of 75%.226 This represents the
minimum likelihood of future sexual violence within five years
that should be required for a five-year commitment.
This result obviously hinges on the assumptions. Take, for
example, duration: substituting three years for five would
219. See id at 279-80 (discussing the utility of actuarial risk assessment
instruments (ARAIs) and how at least one state, Virginia, requires use of ARAls and
refers inmates who score above a certain threshold to undergo a subsequent clinical
evaluation to determine whether the inmate should be civilly committed).
220. Cf Jay Lechner, Note, The 1999 Amendments to the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary
Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act: A Dangerous
Example of Reactionary Legislation, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147, 161 (2000) ("The
Act fails to comply with traditional involuntary commitment precedent and provide that
the risk of danger be substantial within the reasonably foreseeable future.").
221. See supra text accompanying note 20.
222. See Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks. Lessons
from Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279, 1283
(1998) (describing Minnesota's original sex offender commitment law as "one of the first"
when it was passed in 1939); see also ZONANA ET AL., supra note 10, at 11-12 (discussing
the origin of laws for the commitment of sex offenders and describing Minnesota's version
as "typical of the first generation of sex offender commitment laws").
223. Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CoNN. L. REV. 319, 378 (2003).
224. Id. at 378 n.413.
225. All dollar figures in this paragraph are in 2011 dollars.
226. This supports Ron Allen and Larry Laudan's assertion that, on cost-benefit
grounds, the threshold for preventive detention ought to be lower than the threshold for
criminal conviction. Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind
Words for Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781, 801-02 (2011).
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generate a risk threshold of 55%.22 Conversely, a seven-year
detention would be constitutional only with a predicted
recidivism rate at or above 89%. The critical point of this
Article is not the exact number, but the novel methodology
that should guide courts and policymakers into the right
ballpark.
V. IMPLICATIONS
A. Assessing Current Standards
Committing an individual at a low risk level deprives him
of liberty without due process of law. In particular, a standard
of proof and risk threshold combination ought to satisfy due
process if and only if the net probability of five-year recidivism
is greater than 75%. Jurisdictions are all over the map on
these two standards. Which of them, if any, passes
constitutional muster?
The easiest jurisdictions to evaluate are those that require
recidivism to be "more likely than not." This provides an anchor
at 50%. Missouri' and Nebraska'2 " overlay this threshold with
the clear and convincing evidence standard. As Linehan correctly
held, that combination is unconstitutional.2 30 Even assuming the
maximum prediction error, the net recidivism probability goes no
higher than 65%.231 A fortiori, the federal232 and Florida 33
schemes-which couple a risk threshold below 50% with the clear
and convincing standard-also violate due process.
227. In a prior article I showed that an instrument as good as the Static-99 failed to
identify even one individual with an expected three-year recidivism rate above the 50%
level. Vars, supra note 128, at 191.
228. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006) ("more likely than not"); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 632.495(1) (West Supp. 2012) ("clear and convincing evidence").
229. NEB. REV. STAT. §71-1209(1) (2009) ("clear and convincing evidence"); In re
G.H., 781 N.W.2d 438, 445 (Neb. 2010) ("more likely than not").
230. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Minn. 1996), vacated sub nom. Linehan v.
Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), reaffirmed, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999).
231. See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text.
232. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006) ("serious difficulty refraining"); 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)
(2006) ("clear and convincing evidence"); United States v. Hunt, 643 F. Supp. 2d 161, 180
(D. Mass. 2009) ("[Tlhis court does not construe the 'serious difficulty' criterion for
commitment to require proof of any statistical probability of re-offense."); see John
Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and then Commit Him for Life: Analyzing the
Adam Walsh Act's Civil Commitment Scheme Under 18 U.S.C. § 4248, CHAMPION, Feb.
2009, at 44, 44 ("Without a formal requirement of 'likely to reoffend,' it is possible that
low-risk and non-contact sex offenders may be civilly committed indefinitely.").
233. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.917(1) (West 2011) ("clear and convincing evidence");
Hale v. State, 891 So. 2d 517, 520 (Fla. 2004).
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Iowa," Washington,"' and Wisconsin... are also anchored at
50%, but require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the
magnitude of prediction error is decisive (see supra Figure 3).
Only at the highest level of error does the net likelihood of
recidivism clear the 75% bar. These regimes are probably
unconstitutional,23 7 but because factfinders rely on evidence other
than actuarial instruments, and that evidence has unknown
prediction error, one cannot be sure.2
The systems in California and Massachusetts are even less
likely to be constitutional. These two jurisdictions also require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but the state supreme courts
have expressly held that a recidivism risk below 50% can
suffice.' If the threshold is below 40%, then the net risk would
be below the requisite 75% even at the highest level of prediction
error (again, see supra Figure 3).240
Ten other states have similarly nonquantified risk
thresholds, although none of them has clearly stated that a
probability less than 50% can suffice. These jurisdictions use
words like "menace, 24 1 "likely,"242 and "highly likely."243 None of
234. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4) (West 2006) ("more likely than not"); IOWA CODE
ANN.§ 229A.7(5)(a) (West 2006) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
235. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (West 2008) ("more probably than not");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060(1) (West 2008) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
236. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(lm) (West 2007) ("more likely than not"); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 980.05(3)(a) (West 2007) ("beyond a reasonable doubt").
237. But cf Bochnewich, supra note 20, at 306 ("When such statutes are narrowly
drawn to address only the worst of the worst offenders, as is the Washington Sexual
Predator civil commitment scheme, then it seems to be morally responsible, as well as
constitutionally permissible, for states to restrain the offender's liberty based upon
predictions of future behavior.").
238. See Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The
Need To Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 234-35 (1991) (stating that it is "uncertain" in practice
whether Washington's higher proof standard protects against erroneous confinement).
239. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6604 (West 2010) ("beyond a reasonable doubt");
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123A, § 14(d) (West 2003) ("beyond a reasonable doubt");
People v. Ghilotti, 27 Cal. 4th 888, 916 (2002) (stating that "likely" "does not mean the
risk of reoffense must be higher than 50 percent," but instead means the person "presents
a substantial danger-that is, a serious and well-founded risk-of reoffending");
Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Mass. 2002) (defining "likely" not as "more
likely than not," but rather as "would reasonably be expected").
240. A 40% threshold would shift to the left by 10 percentage points the low-error
gray distribution in Figure 3, thereby shifting the peak and effective threshold down from
79% to 69%.
241. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (2005) ("menace"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(9)
(2002) ("pose a menace"); Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 570, 577 (Va. 2005) ("a
menace to the health and safety of others"); ef Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
99 (1943) ("menace") (justifying the internment of Japanese-Americans on the basis that
the government could not quickly determine who "constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety").
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these terms has a fixed meaning,'" so they are all, without
clarifying interpretation, unconstitutional."'
Two cases from Arizona illustrate. In the first, the Arizona
Supreme Court interpreted the statutory term "likely" to mean
"highly probable.""' A later appellate court decision considered a
prosecutor's argument: "But if you were told that tomorrow you
needed to board an airplane and that airplane has a 30 percent
chance of crashing into the ground, is that highly probable to
you?"" In dicta, the court disapproved of the statement because
it "improperly invited the jurors to engage in a balancing test in
assessing probability."2 48
In contrast, other courts have held that balancing is not only
proper, but required:
In assessing the risk of reoffending, it is for the fact finder to
determine what is "likely." Such a determination must be
made on a case-by-case basis, by analyzing a number of
factors, including the seriousness of the threatened harm, the
relative certainty of the anticipated harm, and the possibility
of successful intervention to prevent that harm.24 9
242. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney 2011) ("likely to be a danger to
others") TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.003(a)(2) (West 2010) ("likely"); In re
B.V., 708 N.W.2d 877, 882 (N.D. 2006) (stating that defining "likely" as "of such a degree
as to pose a threat to others ... prevents a contest over percentage points and the results
of other actuarial tools"); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VI) (LexisNexis 2012)
("potentially serious likelihood").
243. In re Leon G., 26 P.3d 481, 489 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc) ("highly probable"), vacated sub
nom. Glick v. Arizona, 535 U.S. 982 (2002); In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 876 (Minn. 1999)
("highly likely"); In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205,218 (N.J. 2002) ("highly likely").
244. See Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Defining the Standard of Proof in Jury Instructions, 1
PSYCH. SCo. 194, 196, 197 tbl.1 (1990) (reporting that jury instructions "likely," "very
likely," and "extremely likely" all elicited essentially the same verdicts); see also Janus &
Prentky, supra note 61, at 1448-49; cf Morse, supra note 54, at 72 (examining similar
standards for mental health commitment).
245. This is not a vagueness argument, which has been rejected many times. E.g.,
State v. Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342, 360-62 (Ohio 2000); cf State of Minn. ex rel. Pearson
v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 309 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1940) (holding that construction
of term "likely" to require more than "strong sexual propensities" which therefore
"destroys the contention that it is too vague and indefinite").
246. In re Leon G., 26 P.3d at 488-89.
247. In re Commitment of Clay, No. 2 CA-MH 2009-0001-SP, 2010 WL 685747, at *3
(Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2010).
248. Id.; cf Laudan & Saunders, supra note 202, at 19 ("Ultimately, it is legislators who
have to make the decision about what utilities to assign these outcomes, for they are the ones
who bear the responsibility for setting the standard of proof. It manifestly should not be judges
or jurors who are left to make such decisions."); J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof Degrees of
Belief, 32 CALF. L. REV. 242, 259 (1944) ("Legislation is not only a way, it is the only way out of
the wilderness."). But cf Kaplan, supra note 179, at 1091-92 (suggesting that jurors should
balance the utilities).
249. Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 49-50 (Mass. 2002) (citing Cross v.
Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). Chief Judge Bazelon in Cross listed
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Whether a legislature intended the word "likely" to carry so
much baggage may be questioned, but the balancing approach
seems intentional, and indeed unavoidable, with the term
"menace."5 0
Perhaps always, but certainly if case-by-case balancing lowers
the recidivism threshold below the constitutional minimum, the
resulting commitment violates due process."' And that seems quite
possible in the present context particularly when presented with a
past conviction or charge, the prospect of future sexual violence will
loom large in the minds of factfinders.252 One study finds that the
public believes 74% of sex offenders will commit another sex offense,
even though the best estimates of the actual recidivism rate are
around 20% or lower." The Arizona prosecutor's analogy to a plane
crash is objectionable not because it invokes balancing, but because
it may be too powerful.
In sum, the sex offender commitment regimes in the
nineteen jurisdictions discussed above are either clearly or
slightly different factors: "the seriousness of the expected harm, the availability of
inpatient and outpatient treatment for the individual concerned, and the expected length
of confinement required for inpatient treatment." Cross, 418 F.2d at 1100. Judge Bazelon
also attempted to set the recidivism threshold higher. See id. at 1097 ("[A] finding of
'dangerousness' must be based on a high probability of substantial injury.").
250. See Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 118 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("By focusing on whether the person 'poses a menace to the
health and safety,' the jury is told it should consider the consequence of reoffending.").
251. The U.S. Supreme Court eschews altogether case-by-case balancing. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) ("[Tlhe standard of proof... must be
calibrated in advance."); see also Laudan & Saunders, supra note 202, at 33 n.31. The
Court has rejected balancing in its Free Speech case law as well. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
252. See Jason A. Cantone, Rational Enough to Punish, but Too Irrational to Release:
The Integrity of Sex Offender Civil Commitment, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 693, 719 (2009)
(explaining the concept of "representativeness heuristic" as the framing of the
community's perception that most sex offenders are reoffenders); Christopher Slobogin,
Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMoRY L.J. 275, 313-14 (2006) (same); La Fond,
supra note 7, at 680 (explaining that people will "assign much greater weight to
information contained in vivid narratives or case histories, even though the information is
quite weak as evidence"). See generally Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1341-43 (2007) (advocating probability thresholds in other contexts to
mitigate the impact of bad heuristics); Christina Wells, Fear and Loathing in
Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 115, 159-60. Heuristics may not be
necessary for over-commitment. See Justin Engel, Comment, Constitutional Limitations
on the Expansion of Involuntary Civil Commitment for Violent and Dangerous Offenders,
8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 841, 863 (2006) ("As a practical matter, the factfinder is likely to
credit past violence as evidence of present dangerousness . . . ."); La Fond, supra note 7, at
678 ("[Jluries are unwilling to take responsibility for releasing someone who might
commit another crime. The burden of this decision is too heavy to ask of citizens.").
253. Levenson et al., supra note 58, at 149 tbl.2, 153 (explaining that best evidence
suggests that recidivism rates among sex offenders range from "5 to 14% over 3- to 6-year
follow-up periods ... and 24% over 15-year follow-up periods... ."); LANGAN, SCHMrrT, &
DUROSE, supra note 13, at 1-2.
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probably unconstitutional." Only one state passes muster, as
described in the next section.
B. A Better Alternative
The most straightforward way to implement the 75%
threshold is simply to require it, with a standard of proof of
preponderance or higher."' Preponderance is sufficient on the
assumption that the prediction is median-unbiased (i.e., too low
half the time and too high half the time). Look back at the first
figure (Figure 1). At any level of prediction error, half of the
distribution is above 50% and half below (by assumption). Adjust
the threshold to 75% and the distributions would be centered
there. The preponderance standard-which is generally defined
to be more likely than not, or greater than 50%"'-is the lowest
proof standard required to ensure that net predicted recidivism
matches or exceeds the 75% risk threshold.
Note that this proposal would arguably require weaker
evidence of dangerousness than the clear and convincing
standard set in Addington, which again has been estimated at
75%. The much higher cost of sexual violence outweighs the
greater deprivation of liberty. Note too that this proposal does
not rely on jurors' understanding the phrases "clear and
convincing evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt." That is a
significant advantage in light of research showing an inability to
do so.257
This proposal is superficially similar to the argument by
Roger Dworkin that burdens of persuasion should be eliminated
because they do not aid the trier of fact, but rather mask
substantive law decisions."' However, I do not advocate
eliminating standards of proof-instead, I propose folding them
into the underlying substantive issue when it is probabilistic and
explicitly balancing the relevant interests as required by
Mathews, Addington, and Santosky.
254. Cf Janus & Meehl, supra note 20, at 41 (concluding based on review of
literature and experience in Minnesota that "the actual probability standards used by the
courts do not reach the 75% mark").
255. I am not the first to advocate quantification, see id. at 60, but I am, to my
knowledge, the first to calculate a precise figure and to argue that something near it is
constitutionally required.
256. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 231 Cal. App. 3d 983, 1000
(1991).
257. Kagehiro, supra note 244, at 194-97 ("[Only the quantified definitions
consistently had their intended effect; the proportion of verdicts favoring the plaintiffs
decreased significantly as the standard of proof became stricter.").
258. Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 VAND. L.
REv. 1151, 1178 (1972).
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Another interesting comparison is to David Simpson, Jr.'s
treatment of civil commitment and dangerousness." His
recommendation is the converse of mine: lower the substantive
dangerousness threshold and raise the standard of proof.260
Simpson believes proof beyond a reasonable doubt would impress
triers of fact with the seriousness of the decision.2 61 To be sure,
there may be symbolic value in a high standard of proof, but that
value would likely disappear if it were known that the standard
did not affect outcomes.26 More fundamentally, the effect of the
standard of proof depends on the magnitude of prediction error,
which is difficult or impossible to know. Setting the substantive
bar at the right height, with a relatively low standard of proof,
avoids this uncertainty.
However, courts are unlikely to adopt a precise numerical
value like the one I propose.263 The last state, Illinois, has come
closest:
We determine that the phrase "substantially probable" in
the Act also means "much more likely than not," a standard
higher than or equal to the "likely" standard found
constitutional in Hendricks. However, we emphasize that
this definition cannot be reduced to a mere mathematical
formula or statistical analysis. Instead the jury must
consider all factors that either increase or decrease the risk
of reoffending, and make a commonsense judgment as to
whether a respondent falls within the class of individuals
who present a danger to society sufficient to outweigh their
interest in individual freedom.6
What the court giveth-a relatively precise (in this area,
at least) and demanding mathematical threshold ("much more
likely than not")-the court taketh away-a disavowal of
mathematics and invitation to open-ended balancing.6 Still,
"much more likely than not" requires a substantial margin
259. David T. Simpson, Jr., Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness
Standard and Its Problems, 63 N.C. L. REv. 241 (1984).
260. Id. at 254.
261. Id. at 255.
262. Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1308 (1977).
263. Cf Jack B. Weinstein & Ian Dewsbury, Comment on the Meaning of 'Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,' 5 LAw, PROB. & RISK 167, 167 (2006) (stating that adoption
of a quantified jury instruction on the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
"doubtful").
264. In re Detention of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
265. Id. At least one commentator has the opposite view. See Ross A. Brennan, Note,
Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually Violent Person Is in
Illinois, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 585 (2011) ("The judiciary's refusal to assign a specific
number to 'substantially probable' is one of the SVPA's strengths.").
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above 50%.2' That would seem to be constitutionally
sufficient. 67
VI. CONCLUSION
A constitutional prerequisite to sex offender commitment is
a finding of dangerousness. An elevated standard of proof is
constitutionally required, but the minimum likelihood of harm is
generally not fixed. This Article closes that gap, providing a very
specific answer as to what due process requires: the risk of
sexually violent recidivism within five years must be at least
75%.
Do any sex offenders clear that hurdle? The recidivism
tables from the current version of the most popular instrument,
the Static-99, include predicted five-year rates at or above 75%
for three categories of offenders." Thousands of sex offenders are
presently committed.' It seems very unlikely that all of them
would satisfy the 75% requirement.2 70 Whether the requirement
deduced here is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"' awaits
further study.272 In the end, perhaps the most that can be said is
266. Cf Eric G. Barber, Note, State v. Laxton: How the Wisconsin Supreme Court
Ignored the U.S. Supreme Court (and Why It May Have Gotten Away with It), 2003 Wis. L.
REV. 977, 996-97 (examining the disagreement among experts in Wisconsin cases
regarding the meaning of "much more likely than not" and "substantially probable");
James Franklin, Case Comment-United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275
(E.D.N.Y. 2005): Quantification of the 'Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' Standard, 5
LAW, PROB. & RISK 159, 165 (2006) (recommending "well above a probability of 0.8" as a
definition for beyond a reasonable doubt).
267. Again, the efficacy of nonquantified standards of proof is doubtful, see Kagehiro,
supra note 244, at 196, but the fact that Illinois requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
may bolster this conclusion. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 207/35(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2000).
268. Static-99R Violent Recidivism Estimates, supra note 120. One wrinkle is that
the Static-99 tables are based on any violent recidivism, not just sexual violence. Some
have argued that violent recidivism is actually a better measure of sexual violence than
sexually violent recidivism because the sexual component of a crime-e.g., sexual
assault-is often omitted as too difficult to prove. Marnie E. Rice et al., Violent Sex
Offenses: How Are They Best Measured from Official Records?, 30 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
525, 526-27 (2006). But surely the category of violent crime is over-inclusive.
269. See GOOKIN, supra note 12, at 1, 4.
270. See Vars, supra note 128, at 188-89, 191.
271. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
272. See von Hirsch, supra note 45, at 740 ("Even if this kind of cost-benefit thinking
were appropriate, it is highly questionable whether the preventive confinement model
could be justified in its terms-once the magnitude of the 'cost' of confining large numbers
of false positives is fully taken into account."). Von Hirsch, it should be noted, would not
wait for the numbers. See id. (preventive detention with false positives "is unacceptable in
absolute terms because it violates the obligation of society to do individual justice");
accord Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 534, 557 (1986); Morse, supra
note 192, at 135.
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that the Constitution narrowly circumscribes sex offender civil
commitment.
Even if courts do not adopt the unitary approach as a matter
of constitutional law, the formal balancing method set forth in
this Article should guide legislative and prosecutorial
decisionmaking. Committing sex offenders with a five-year
recidivism risk below 75% is generally not cost-benefit justified.
Nor, the analysis suggests, would be committing noncontact sex
offenders even if they are nearly certain to reoffend.
This Article has significance beyond sex offender
commitment. Its most direct relevance is to pretrial detention
and traditional mental illness civil commitment. More broadly,
the Article elucidates the relationship between standards of proof
and probabilistic thresholds to be proven. That relationship holds
for any probabilistic element and is critical in assessing the
interests served by any combination of the two standards,
whether done by courts, jurors, legislators, or prosecutors. The
Article applies decision theory to the Court's balancing test for
determining the minimum constitutional standard of proof.
Estimating the utilities needed for this approach may be even
more difficult in other contexts, 7 ' but the framework is
instructive nonetheless.
Fear of sex offenders, and uncertainty in case law, is their
passage to limbo. The rational balancing of interests required by
the Constitution would close that door to all but the very
dangerous.
273. But cf Vars, supra note 129, at 12 (estimating utilities in will contests); Laudan
& Saunders, supra note 202, at 23 & n.24 (proposing hypothetical questions to elicit
utilities in criminal cases).
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